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Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent?∗
Gae¨l Giraud and Ce´cile Renouard
April 19, 2011
Abstract.— Theories of justice in the spirit of Rawls and Harsanyi argue
that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society as if in the
original position, that is, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from
knowing their own social positions. In this paper, we provide a fairly simple
framework showing that preferences in front of the veil of ignorance (i.e., in
face of everyday risky situations) can be entirely deduced from ethical pref-
erences behind the veil. Moreover, by contrast with Kariv & Zame (2008),
in many cases of interest, the converse is not true: Ethical decisions can-
not be deduced from economic ones. This not only rehabilitates distributive
theories of justice but even proves that standard decision theory in economic
environments cannot be exonerated from ethical questioning.
Keywords. Moral preferences, business ethics, social preferences, distributional
justice, theory of justice, social choice, original position, veil of ignorance, utilitari-
anism, maximin principle.
JEL Classification: D63.
∗ We thank, without implicating, Jacques Dre`ze and Franc¸ois Maniquet, as well as two anonymous
referees and the participants of the “Cercle d’Episte´mologie e´conomique” (University Paris-1) for
helpful comments. The usual caveat applies.
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1 Introduction
Rawls (1971, 1974) and Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1975) have constructed theories of
social justice based on the choices that representatives should make for society in
what Rawls names the “original position”, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents
people from know- ing their own future positions. Rawls (1971) views preferences
in the original position as having a different nature from “ordinary” preferences
for consumption, for risk or for the distribution of social goods to others. Rawls
specifies that the parties in the original position are concerned only with citizens’
share of what he calls primary social goods, which include basic rights as well as
economic and social advantages. Rawls also argues that the representatives in the
original position would adopt the maximin rule as their principle for evaluating the
choices before them, i.e., making the choice that produces the highest payoff for the
least advantaged position. Being behind the veil of ignorance guarantees that the
conception of justice to emerge will be agreed upon in a fair situation. “Fairness
of the circumstances under which agreement is reached transfers into the fairness of
the principles agreed to” (Rawls (1974)). Since these principles serve as principles
of justice, the veil of ignorance therefore plays a crucial role in Rawls’ construction
of “justice as fairness”.
In this paper, we shall consider the situation of a Representative who can face
three types of decision-making problem: (1) Behind the veil of ignorance, her pref-
erences will be called “ethical”;1 (2) in a risky individual decision problem (in front
of the veil), her preferences will be termed “risk preferences”; (3) finally, in a social
choice problem (still in front of the veil, since the Representative is assumed to know
her position), her preferences will be “social”.2
If Rawls and Harsanyi come to quite different conclusions about the form ethical
preferences should take behind the veil of ignorance respectively the maximin and
the “utilitarian” criteria, this is mainly due to their different view on the attitude of
people towards uncertainty behind the veil of ignorance. Nevertheless, both Harsanyi
and Rawls agree to view the original position as a purely hypothetical situation, a
thought experiment where ethical preferences are theoretical constructs that should
conform to some rationality requirements, paving the road towards various theories
of justice.
By contrast, Kariv and Zame (2008) have recently introduced a framework en-
compassing both risk, social and ethical preferences, where they show that, under
some assumptions, ethical preferences in the original position are entirely determined
by risk and social preferences, i.e., by preferences that are not hypothetical at all. In
other words, according to these authors, preferences behind the veil of ignorance can
be deduced from preferences in front of the veil of ignorance. Since these authors
view risk and social preferences as being essentially arbitrary, they conclude that
“there is no conceptual reason to expect that moral preferences should be consistent
with any particular notion of rationality or theory of justice”. Thus, at variance
with both Rawls and Harsanyi, Kariv and Zame (2008) reach a conclusion similar
1Following Ricœur’s (1992, p.170) distinction between ethics as the aim of an accomplished life
(teleological perspective) and morality as the norms related to a deontological point of view, we
prefer here the term “ethical” to “moral”.
2For a recent survey of the literature on social preferences, see Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
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to that of Hayek (1976), according to whom social justice is a “mirage”.
In this paper, we challenge this viewpoint by reexamining the framework intro-
duced by Kariv and Zame (2008). Starting with the same setting, but adopting
different assumptions (which encompass more classic preferences than do the as-
sumptions needed by Kariv and Zame (2008)), we provide an extremely simple proof
of exactly the opposite result: Risk and social preferences can be entirely deduced
from ethical ones. Moreover, we show by means of examples (see subsection 4.2 be-
low) that many cases of interest (such as the leximin criterion or utilitarianism) do
not fulfill Kariv and Zame (2008) assumptions but verify the axioms of this paper.
In such examples, not only do risk and social preferences follow from ethical ones,
but the converse is not true: Ethical preferences cannot be deduced from risk and
social ones. Thus, we agree with Kariv and Zame (2008) that there is a link between
preferences behind and in front of the veil of ignorance. In our view, however, the
implication goes in the reverse direction: Theories of justice cannot be reduced to
descriptive theories (how people actually behave de facto) but are indeed norma-
tive theories (how people ought to choose). As for risk and social preferences, they
cannot be reduced to descriptive rules of thumb either: They belong to prescriptive
theories (i.e., practical aids to choice) which follow from ethical decisions.
The next section provides our set-up. Section 3 shows how risk and social pref-
erences can be deduced from ethical ones. Section 4 studies the reverse relatiohship.
Examples and counter-examples are provided in section 5. Finally, the last section
contains a discussion of the main conceptual issues at stake.
2 Choice environments
Following Kariv & Zame (2008), society consists of N actors, i = 1, ..., N , of
whom there is no loss of generality in assuming that the Representative is player
1.3 Three environments are considered. In the first, termed the ethical choice
environment, the objects of choice are allocations of prospects for all members of
the society, including the Representative, but in a setting where the Representative
does not know her position in the society, nor the positions of others. In the sec-
ond environment, called the social choice environment, the objects of choice are
(deterministic) allocations of prospects for all the members of society, including the
Representative. By contrast with the ethical environment, the Representative in
the social choice environment knows what her social position will be before taking
a decision. In the third, which we term the risk environment, objects of choice
are random individual prospects for the Representative. As for prospects, they may
designate a huge variety of items: utility levels, income, poverty indices, etc.4
Choice spaces are formalized as follows:
• The choice space R in the individual risk environment consists of all
lotteries, that is, collections
(pjxj)j=1,...,K , (1)
3In subsection 4.2, Example 2, below, an alternate interpretation of the indices i = 1, ... will be
proposed.
4Notice that preferences need not be increasing with respect to prospects.
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where (pj)j is a probability vector
5, and each xj ∈ R is a prospect.6 The
lottery (1) yields the Representative prospect xj with probability pj .
• The choice space S in the social choice environment consists of all
deterministic allocations xj (not to be confused with xj) in RN . This
allocation yields the citizen i ∈ N the prospect xji with certainty.
Let Perm(N) be the group of permutations σ : N → N . Given some vector
x ∈ RN and some permutation σ ∈ Perm(N), the composition xσ is again an
element of RN assigning prospect xσ(i) to individual i.
• The choice space E in the ethical choice environment consists of all
lotteries
(
pσ(xσ)
)
σ∈Perm(N)
where (pσ) is a probability distribution on the set Perm(N) and x ∈
RN . This lottery yields citizen i prospect xσ(i) with probability pσ.
In particular, it provides the Representative with prospect xσ(1) with
probability pσ (for all σ ∈ Perm(N)).
In the risk environment, the Representative is simply a decision maker who must
choose a random prospect for herself. In the social choice environment, the Rep-
resentative is to choose a deterministic prospect for every individual in the society.
In the ethical choice environment, she is to choose a deterministic distribution of
prospects across society but with the random assignment of individuals to places in
society. When interpreted in terms of Knightian riskiness, this ethical choice environ-
ment (with equal probabilities) coincides with Harsanyi’s (1953,1955) formalization
of ethical decisions (more on this in Example 2 infra).
One consequence of our approach is that the set of ethical choices is rich enough
to include all social choices. On this aspect, we agree with Kariv & Zame (2008):
If part of the social choice problem was to escape from any ethical questioning, our
standpoint is that this would have to be a priori justified.
In the ethical, social choice and risk environments, the Representative’s prefer-
ence relations are written e,s and r respectively. In order to be able to shift
from one environment to the other, we need to consider a global set-up encompassing
both E ,S and R. Let us therefore denote by L the space of lotteries over allocations:
(pjx
j)j , (2)
where each xj ∈ RN is an allocation. The lottery given by (2) yields xj1 to the
Representative with probability pj . Sometimes, we write (2) in the form (pjx
j)
when the index is clear. (1xj) stands for the degenerate lottery yielding allocation
xj for sure.
5That is, pj ≥ 0, for each j, and ∑j pj = 1.
6A prospect may be an income, a utility level or any quantitative characterization of an economic
situation. For simplicity, they are assumed, here, to be real numbers but prospects might take value
in a multi-dimensional space (or an abstract space of outcomes) without impairing our results.
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The space L encompasses the three environments mentioned supra. To see that
R ⊂ L, it suffices to identify the individual lottery (pjxj) ∈ R with the lottery
of collective allocations (pj(xj , 0, ..., 0)) ∈ L. That is, identify R as the subset of S
consisting of lotteries that yield all individuals but the Representative the 0 prospect
almost surely. There is no doubt that this identification is highly disputable. We
borrow it from Kariv & Zame (2008). The discussion of alternative ways to tackle
this issue would go beyond the scope of this paper and is postponed to further work.
Similarly, S is identified with the subset of L consisting of degenerate lotteries ; E
is identified with the subset of L consisting of lotteries of the form (pσxσ)σ with the
property that xσ = xσ for each σ ∈ Perm(N).
3 Deducing risk preferences from ethical preferences
Preferences will be characterized by two postulates. The first gathers hardly contro-
versial rationality requirements on global preferences  over L. Before stating them
explicitly, let us recall the definition of compound lotteries. Suppose that L1, ..., LK
are K lotteries, and (pk)k=1,...,K is a probability distribution. Then, (pkLk)k de-
notes a compound lottery in the following sense: One and only one lottery will be
the prize, and the probability that it will be Lk is pk.
A0 (i) Transitivity. The relation  on L is transitive.
(ii) Reduction of compound lotteries. Any compound lottery in L is indiff-
ferent to a simple lottery, their probabilities being computed according
to the ordinary calculus. In particular, if (qk)k is a probability distribu-
tion and each Lk = (p
i
kx
i)i for k = 1, ...,K, is a lottery, then there is no
loss of generality in assuming that they all involve the same finite set,
(xj)j , of allocations, and moreover
(qkLk)k ∼ (p˜jxj)j
with p˜j :=
∑
k qkp
j
k.
(iii) Continuity. Given any collection of allocations (x1, ..., xK) ∈ SK ,
ordered (without loss of generality) so that xi s xi+1 for every 1 ≤ i ≤
K − 1, then every xi is indifferent in L to some lottery involving only x1
and xK , i.e., there exists a probability pi ∈ [0, 1] such that
xi ∼ (pix1, 0x2, ..., 0xK−1, (1− pi)xK) =: Xi. (3)
(iv) Substitutability. In any lottery (pkx
k)k and for every i, X
i (as
defined by (3)) can be substituted to xi, that is: (p1x
1, ..., pKx
K) ∼
(p1x
1, ..., piX
i, ..., pKx
K).
A0 (iii) is a continuity assumption on global preferences .7 Suppose, indeed,
that x1 s x2 s x3. It is plausible that the lottery (px1, (1 − p)x3) is preferred
7Cf. Luce and Raiffa (1957), p. 27.
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to x2 as p approaches 1, and that the preference is inverted when p is close to 0.
This assumption simply says that, as p shifts from 0 to 1, there is some inversion
point where the two are indifferent. Notice that we do not require global preferences
 to be complete. Nor do we require any form of independence which, together
with the other axioms gives rise to the linear structure of expected utility, and
has been controversial from the beginning. Allais’ paradox, for instance, has been
usually understood as an evidence of the failure of such independence axioms (cf.
e.g. Rabin & Thaler (2001)).
The next postulate concerns social choice preferences.
A1 Convertibility. For every x, y ∈ S, there exist (z, σ) ∈ S × Perm(N)
such that
z ∼s x and zσ ∼s y.
A1 says that any pair of allocations in S can be converted into an auxiliary pair
of allocations related to each other by a permutation. Convertibility is implied by
(but does not imply) the following selfishness assumption introduced by Kariv &
Zame (2008):8
B1 selfishness. x ∼s (x1, 0, ..., 0) for every x ∈ S.
Unfortunately, postulate A1 on social choice preferences is not satisfied by many
examples of interest (see subsection 4.2 infra). Therefore, we shall consider as well
an alternative postulate on global preferences:
A2 Reduction of simple lotteries. For every simple lottery of the form
L = (pxj , (1 − p)yj) ∈ L, there exists a deterministic allocation x ∈ S
such that:
x ∼ L.
A2 says that, in terms of preferences, every random allocation admits a certain
equivalent. It is satisfied by most of the textbook preferences towards risk we are
aware of (see, nevertheless, Example 4 infra for a counterexample).
Theorem. 1) For all ethical preferences e and for social preferences sat-
isfying A1, there is a unique global preference relation  on L verifying
A0 such that its restriction to E coincides with e. Hence, if  verify A0
and are such that s satisfy A1, then both risk preferences, r, and social
preferences, s, can be deduced from ethical preferences e.
2) For all ethical and social preferences, there is a unique global preference
relation  on L verifying A0 and A2 whose restriction to E coincides with
e. Hence, if  verifies both A0 and A2, then risk preferences and social
preferences can be deduced from ethical preferences.
8To see that B1 ⇒ A1, consider z := (x1, y1, 0, ...0) and zσ := (y1, x1, 0, ..., 0). B1 implies that
z ∼s x and zσ ∼s y.
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Proof. 1) Since S ⊂ E , social preferences can be deduced from ethical pref-
erences. What we have to prove is that global preferences over L can be deduced
from ethical preferences e (although, obviously, L is not a subset of E). Given
assumption A0(i)-(iv) on global preferences , they verify the following property:9
For any lottery (pjx
j)j=1,...,K ∈ L, it is possible to find a lottery involving only x1
and xK , and to which it is indifferent. That is, there exists p ∈ [0, 1] such that
(pjx
j)j ∼
(
px1, (1− p)xK).
Indeed, take L := (pjx
j)j=1,...,K ∈ L. Continuity and substitutability imply that
L ∼ (pjXj)j , where Xj = (qjx1, (1− qj)xK) is defined as in (3). Reduction of com-
pound lotteries and transitivity imply that L ∼ ((∑j pjqj)x1, (∑j pj(1 − qj))xK).
Therefore, for our purposes, it suffices to prove that the restriction of global pref-
erences  on simple lotteries of the form (px, (1 − p)y) can be deduced from e.
Assumption A1 enables us to find (z, σ) ∈ S× Perm(N) such that x ∼s z and
y ∼s zσ. Given ethical preferences e, let us therefore define global preferences by:(
px1, (1− p)y1)  (qx2, (1− q)y2) ⇐⇒ (pz1, (1− p)z1σ1) e (qz2, (1− q)z2σ2).
Clearly, global preferences defined this way will coincide with ethical preferences
when restricted to E , and hence with social preferences when restricted to S. (When-
ever
(
pz1, (1−p)z1σ1
)
and
(
qz2, (1− q)z2σ2
)
cannot be compared due to the lack of
completeness of e, then they cannot be compared either with respect to , which
will therefore be incomplete.) On the other hand, since global (hence, also ethical)
preferences are transitive, they are uniquely defined this way. Suppose, indeed, there
are two pairs (z, σ), (z′, σ′) ∈ E such that
z ∼ z′ ∼ x and zσ ∼ z′σ′ ∼ y.
Then, z e zσ ⇐⇒ z′ e z′σ′ ⇐⇒ x  y. Therefore, the restriction of  to R
yields a unique preference relation, r, in the risk environment.
2) Take two simple lotteries L1, L2 ∈ L of the form Li =
(
pxi, (1−p)yi)
i=1,2
. By
A2, there exist x, y ∈ S with x ∼ L1 and y ∼ L2. Define global preferences  by
L1  L2 ⇐⇒ x e y.

Example 4 in subsection 4.2 will show that our Theorem is tight in the sense
that one cannot relax both A1 and A2 without impairing our result.
4 Deducing ethics from economic decisions?
The previous section provided fairly weak assumptions under which risk and social
preferences are uniquely determined by ethical ones. By contrast, we provide, now,
a somewhat severe restriction that will be shown to imply the opposite property,
that is, under which ethical preferences can be deduced from risk and social ones.
WI Weak independence. For every probability vector, (pj), and every pair of
arrays of allocations (xj)j and (y
j)j , one has:
9See Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 28).
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xj  yj∀j ⇒ (pjxj)j  (pjyj)j .
WI is a weakening of the familiar independence axiom, and does not imply expected
utility (even combined with the rest of assumption A0).10
C Probabilistic self-regarding. 1) Let (pσx
σ) and (qσy
σ) be two lotter-
ies in E \ S such that (pσxσ) e (qσyσ). Then, there exists a pair,
(x˜σ)σ, (y˜
σ)σ, of allocations in S such that:
(
pσ(x˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
) ∼ (pσxσ)
and
(
qσ(y˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
) ∼ (qσyσ). Moreover, for each such pair (x˜σ, y˜σ)σ,
one has:
(
pσ(x˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
) r (qσ(y˜σ1 , 0, ..., 0)).
Roughly speaking, condition C says that 1) every non-degenerate random allocation
in E is indifferent to some random allocation in R, and 2) when evaluating a random
allocation in E , the Representative does not pay attention to the way randomness
affects citizens different from herself. To put it differently, the attitude towards risk
of citizens different from 1 has no impact on global preferences. We view this as a
particularly severe restriction: How “ethical” are ethical preferences neglecting the
risk aversion of the population’s vast majority ?
Proposition 1.— If ethical preferences, e, satisfy weak independence
WI, then the two following conditions are equivalent:
(a) e can be deduced from r and s;
(b) e verify C.
Proof.
(a) ⇒ (b). Suppose that (b) is not satisfied; we prove that (a) fails. Let us
denote by E ⊂ (E \ S) the subset of random allocations (pσxσ) for which there
exists (x˜σ) ∈ S with (pσ(x˜σ1 , 0, ..., 0)) ∼ (pσxσ). Suppose that E 6= (E \S), and take
(pσx
σ) in E \ (E ∪ S). Then, consider two global preferences, 1 and 2, whose
restrictions to R (identified with a subset of L thanks to Axiom SC) and S both
coincide with r and s, and such that, for some (qσyσ) ∈ E :
(pσx
σ) 1 (qσyσ) while (pσxσ) ≺2 (qσyσ).
The restrictions to E of 1 and 2 do not coincide although both global preferences
are compatible with r and s. Hence e is not uniquely determined by risk and
social choice preferences.
Suppose, next, that E = E but there exists a pair of lotteries, (pσxσ), (qσyσ), with
the property that (pσx
σ)  (qσyσ) and yet
(
pσ(x˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
) ≺r (qσ(y˜σ1 , 0, ..., 0)) for
some allocations (x˜σ, y˜σ) ∈ S verifying (pσ(x˜σ1 , 0, ...0)) ∼ (pσxσ) and (qσ(y˜σ1 , 0, ...0)) ∼
(qσy
σ).11 Consider the ethical preference, ∗e, defined by:
10Weak independence is sometimes known as the “sure thing principle”, and is essentially identical
to the game-theoretical principle that a rational individual will avoid using any weakly dominated
strategy.
11Recall that  need not be transitive.
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(pσx
σ) ∗e (qσyσ) ⇐⇒
(
pσ(x˜
σ
1 , 0, ..., 0)
) r (qσ(y˜σ1 , 0, ..., 0)).
Then, ∗e 6=e although they are both compatible with r and s. Hence, given
risk and social preferences, ethical preferences are not uniquely defined.
(b)⇒ (a). It suffices to define ∗e as above, and to conclude from weak indepen-
dence that ethical preferences are uniquely defined once r and s are given.

Let us now recall the restrictions on social preferences introduced by Kariv and
Zame (2008). In addition to being complete, transitive, reflexive, and continuous,
they need to verify:
B2 The worst outcome. x s 0 for every x ∈ S.
This requirement is specific to their framework as they impose allocations to take
value in RN+ . No such restriction is needed in our set-up.
B3 Self-regarding. For each x ∈ S, there is a t ∈ R+ such that (t, 0, ..., 0) s
x.
Clearly, selfishness B1 is a strengthening of “self-regarding” B3. The two results
proven in Kariv and Zame (2008) that are of interest to us are the following:
Proposition 2.— (Kariv and Zame (2008)) 1) For all risk preferences
and social preferences that satisfy B2 and B3, there is a unique preference
relation  on L verifying WI and whose restriction to S (resp. R) coincides
with s (resp. r). Hence, if  verifies Weak independence, then ethical
preferences can be deduced from risk and social preferences.
2) If social preferences are selfish (i.e., satisfy B1), then  has the following
property: For all lotteries (pjx
j), (qky
k) ∈ L,
(pjx
j)j  (qkyk)k ⇐⇒
(
pj(x
j
1, 0, ..., 0)
)
j
r
(
qk(y
k
1 , 0, ..., 0)
)
k
.
It is easily shown that, if WI, B2 and B3 are fulfilled, so is C. Hence, Part 1
of Proposition 2 follows from Part 2 of our Proposition 1. The second part of
Proposition 2 says that, if the Representative is selfish (in the sense of B1) in the
social choice environment, then preferences in the risk environment coincide with
ethical preferences. Given the widespread use of expected utility, this seems prima
facie to promote a definition of ethical preferences as being given by the expected
utility of random allocations xσ for σ ∈ Perm(N):
U
[
(pσx
σ)
]
:=
∑
σ
pσ
∑
i
λixσ(i). (4)
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Notice, however, that Proposition 2 is hardly compatible with (4) since this criterion
does not verify selfishness B1 unless the weights (λi)i attributed to citizens are
λ1 > 0 and λi = 0 for every i 6= 1 —in which case (4) simply reduces to dictatorship !
Nor would (4) fulfill B2 once prospects are allowed to take values that are unbounded
from below. Whether (4) can be understood in terms of Harsanyi’s “utilitarian
ethics” is discussed below in Example 2.
5 Examples
The first three examples satisfy our axioms but fail to verify C(hence the assump-
tions adopted by Kariv and Zame (2008) as well). The last example shows that our
main result fails if Axiom A is abandoned.
Example 1. The Maximin criterion (both with respect to risk and with respect
to citizens) can be defined by the global utility function on L:
M
(
(pkx
k)k
)
:= min
k,i
xki . (5)
Axioms C, A0 are verified but neither B2, nor B3 (hence B1), and C .12 Moreover,
even under the Strong Compatibility assumption, ethical preferences e cannot be
deduced from risk preferences s when allocations are constrained to take values
in RN+ . Indeed, the restriction of (5) to allocations of the form (x1, 0, ..., 0) yields a
constant mapping, so that risk preferences are trivial. On the other hand, consider
the auxiliary utility function on global lotteries:
N
(
(pkx
k)k
)
:= min
{
min
k
xk1 ; min
i6=1
∑
k
pkxki
}
. (6)
The restriction of (6) to R and S yields the same risk and social preferences as
(5), while the restrictions of both global utilities to the ethical environment, E , are
distinct. Hence, ethical preferences cannot be deduced from r and s.
Following Harsanyi (1975, 1978), one has argued that the risk preferences in-
duced by (5) in the R setting are hardly realistic. Quite on the contrary, both
theoretical investigations (see, e.g., Artzner et al. (1999)) and empirical practices of
stress tests in the financial industry suggest that behaviors at least close to the ones
dictated by (5) are not relegated to exotic matters, even in the highly specific set-up
of individual risk. Similarly, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) have reintroduced the
maximin principle within decision theory in face of uncertainty. On the (determin-
istic) social choice side, such an egalitarian criterion has been strongly advocated by
Fleurbaye and Maniquet (2006) in a purely ordinal setting.
Finally, we must admit that it is unclear whether Rawls would agree with our use
of probabilities (which are absent from his description of the “original position”).
We do not lay claim to Rawlsian orthodoxy on this point.
Example 2. Consider lotteries involving at most K ≥ 2 allocations,13 (xk)k,
ordered so that pk+1 ≤ pk for k = 1, ...,K − 1. A criterion akin to some kind of
“utilitarianism” (again, both with respect to risk and to citizens) can be defined by:
12This would be true also for Leximin preferences as well.
13We know from the proof of the Theorem that this involves no loss of generality.
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U
(
(pkx
k)k
)
:=
∑
k
pk
∑
i
λki x
k
i , (7)
with λki ∈ R. This alternate criterion fulfills C, A0 and A2 but fails to verify
B3, B1 and A1. Moreover, when the individual weights λki depend upon k in a
non-trivial way, Cis not satisfied either, so that ethical preferences e cannot be
deduced from risk r and social s preferences. Indeed, neither r nor s depend
upon λki for k ≥ 2 and i ≥ 2. On the side of individual risk, (7) corresponds to
risk-neutrality which is widely used for pricing and hedging financial derivatives.
On the side of social choice, it has received an axiomatic foundation by Mertens and
Dhillon (1999).
There has been considerable controversy over “utilitarian ethics” in the way it is
defended by Harsanyi, as in the debate between Sen (1976, 1977, 1986) and Harsanyi
(1975, 1977a). Here, when pσ = 1/N ! for each permutation σ ∈ Perm(N), our frame-
work becomes compatible with Harsanyi’s (1975) “equi-probability model of moral
value judgments”. To see this point, recall that, in Harsanyi’s (1978) view, the
Representative “would certainly satisfy our impartiality and impersonality require-
ments if he did not know how his choice between [lotteries] A and B would affect
him personally and, in particular, if he did not know what his own social position
would be in situations A and B”. Thus, the Representative is assumed to think that
in either (randomly selected) situation he would have the same probability 1/N to
occupy any one of the N possible social positions. Therefore, in Harsanyi (1978), the
Representative does not even know her own risk preferences, as these preferences are
attached to the position she will occupy, while, here, a lottery in E involves various
random prospects to individuals i = 1, ..., N (including the Representative) knowing
her own, fixed, risk preferences, ir.
Nevertheless, our approach is broad enough to encompass Harsanyi’s set-up as a
particular case of ours: Suppose that the index i = 1, ..., N does not label individuals
but “social positions”, which may be occupied by every individual. Take L = 1 and
suppose that each position i = 1, ..., N is identified with a given utility function:
Ui : A → R defined on some auxiliary space, A, of random situations, (pkAk)k.
An allocation of prospects, (xi)i ∈ RN , is now a N -tuple of utility levels (Ui(A))i,
derived from any random situation A ∈ A.14 Restrict E to equiprobable lotteries,
(pσx
σ)σ∈Perm(N), of size N !, with pσ = 1/N !, every σ. By construction, a form of
“selfishness” is implicit in Harsanyi’s framework since, whatever being her position
i, the Representative only cares about her own individual risk preferences, Ui, as-
sociated to this very position, and not about the preferences of the other citizens
occupying different positions — so that B3, now, makes sense. Within this spe-
cific set-up, Proposition 2-2 provides a first step towards Harsanyi’s conslusion. It
suffices, indeed, to complete the assumptions needed for Proposition 2-2 by any ax-
iomatics which characterizes individual risk preferences in terms of expected utility
14Admittedly, this construction involves interpersonal utility comparisons —which is consistent
with Harsanyi’s (1977b, 1978) claim that “there are non valid arguments against such comparisons”.
Though we do believe that there are valid arguments against intersubjective comparisons (whose
discussion would go beyond the scope of this paper and is abundantly illustrated in the litterature),
it is only fair to permit them in order to characterize Harsanyi’s setting as a particular instance of
ours.
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in order to get:
UH
[
(pσx
σ)
]
:=
1
N !
∑
σ
xσ(1)
=
1
N
∑
i
xi
=
1
N
∑
i
Ui(A).
The advantage of this reformulation is to illuminate the role of the selfishness re-
quirement B1 underlying this “utilitarian”15 appproach of ethics.16
Example 3. (Kariv and Zame (2008)) Take N = 2. Let g : R → R be any
continuous, strictly increasing function with the property that g(t) = t for t ≤ 0.
Define the global utility function Wg : L → R by:
Wg
(
p1(x1, y1), p2(x2, y2)
)
:= p1g
(−ex1 + y1)+ p2g(−ex2 + y2),
for any simple lottery in L involving only two allocations (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) with
p1 ≥ p2.17 The restriction of Wg on R does not depend on g since g(t) = t for
t ≤ 0. The social preferences induced by Wg on S do not depend upon g because
g is strictly increasing. However, the ethical preferences induces by Wg on E do
depend on g: The weight given to inequality between citizens depends on g. Hence,
ethical preferences cannot be deduced from risk and social choice preferences, so
that Proposition 1 above fails. This is due to the failure of B3: Preferences induced
by Wg on S are not self-regarding. Neither are they probabilistically self-regarding,
so that C is, in turn, violated. By contrast, the intermediate value theorem ensures
that Wg verifies A2, while A0 is obvious. Hence, our Theorem holds in this setting.
Example 4. Again, take N = 2. Let f : R→ R be continuous, strictly increasing
with the property that f(t) = t whenever t ≥ 0. Define the global utility function
Uf,λ : L → R as follows. For every lottery L =
(
p1(x1, y1), p2(x2, y2)
)
with p1 ≥ p2:
Uf,λ(L) := p1f(|x1| − y1) + p2λf
(
max
i=1,2
|xi − yi| − min
i=1,2
|xi − yi|
)
,
for a given parameter λ ∈ R\{0}. The risk preferences induced by Uf,λ on R reduce
to
Uf,λ(L) = p1f(|x1|) + p2λf
(
max
i=1,2
|xi| − min
i=1,2
|xi|
)
,
for every L :=
(
p1(x1, 0), p2(x2, 0)
)
and do not depend on f (as f(t) = t for t ≥ 0).
Nor do social choice preferences since, for every allocation (x1, y1) ∈ S, Uf,λ(x1, y1) =
f(|x1| − y1), and f is strictly increasing. However, the ethical preferences induced
15Quotation marks, here, wish to emphasize that Harsanyi’s terminology does not reflect the much
broader standpoint of, say, John Stuart Mill (1861), for whom “utilitarianism” also encompasses
non-self-oriented behaviors (e.g., the Biblical Golden rule) which obviously contradict B3.
16See the discussion of (4) supra.
17By the same argument as in the proof of our Theorem, it suffices to consider such simple
lotteries.
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by Uf,λ on E do depend on f , again because the weight given to inequality depends
upon f . Thus, ethical preferences cannot be deduced from risk and social choice
preferences. This time, it is B2 that fails: There is no worst outcome. On the
other hand, that C is not satisfied is obvious. At variance with Example 3, however,
Uf,λ does not verify our convertibility assumption A1. Similarly, Uf,λ does not
satisfy A2 in general, so that our Theorem fails as well. Indeed, for every allocation
z = (x, y), Uf,λ
(
pz, (1−p)zσ) = pf(|x|−y) whatever being the probability p ∈ (0, 1]
with p ≥ 1 − p.18 Hence, ethical preferences do not depend upon λ, while global
preferences do. In particular, risk preferences depend upon λ, and hence, cannot be
deduced from ethical ones.
6 Discussion
What do we concretely mean when we claim that economic decisions can be “de-
duced” from ethical ones ? Obviously, we do not intend to provide a substantialist
definition of ethics in the Aristotelian style. Rather, this paper confines itself within
the Kantian (liberal) tradition according to which every person is responsible for de-
ciding what (ethical) “good” means for her. Nevertheless, following Rawls, Harsanyi
and many other social philosophers (such as, e.g., J. Habermas (1991)), we view ethi-
cal decisions behind the veil of ignorance as being potentially discussed in the public
space of debates, on the basis of rational arguments such as those encapsulated
in the various axiomatics of social choice theory already alluded to.19 Claiming
that economic decisions depend upon ethical ones therefore concretely means that
economic and social decisions should be included in the agenda of ethical public
debates. They cannot be derived from individual risk preferences, from which they
would inherit the undebatable arbitrariness. If one adopts the axioms of Theorem 1,
then choosing among various political and economic systems is not the same kind of
decision as choosing among various financial portfolios or various menus in a restau-
rant. If, now, individual risk preferences, r, are interpreted as preferences of a
politician who faces various voting systems and aims at maximizing the chance of
being (re)elected, this paper also shows that political decisions cannot be reduced
to the self-interested calculus of politicians, contrary to what tends to assume the
public choice school (cf. e.g., Buchanan & Tullock (1962)). This does not mean that
we deny any relevance to the public choice approach: All we claim is that such a
self-interested calculus cannot exhaust the freedom of politicians and cannot exon-
erate their decisions from any ethical questioning — unless one is ready to adopt
the restrictive assumptions of subsection 4.1.
How “realistic” is our conclusion that ethical preferences cannot be deduced from
every-day behavior on the economic field? Many contemporary “utilitarians” have
claimed that voting for the maximin principle is only optimal for infinitely risk averse
Representatives. This argument takes as granted that each person is only interested
in her own material payoff —not surprisingly, this is exactly assumption B1— and
claims that it is legitimate to disregard the Maximin principle on the ground that
people’s everyday behavior does not fit with infinite risk-aversion. This presupposes
18Here, σ denotes the unique non-trivial permutation over {1, 2}.
19See, in particular, Mertens & Dhillon (1999) and Fleurbaey & Maniquet (2008).
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exactly what this paper challenges, namely that ethical preferences can be deduced
from risk preferences.
Ho¨risch (2007) has implemented the Rawlsian thought experiment of a veil of
ignorance as a laboratory experiment. There, it is found that both men and women
react to the risk introduced by the veil of ignorance in a way that is significantly
distinct from their attitude towards risk in front of the veil. Women additionally
exhibit social preferences that reflect an increased concern for equality. These find-
ings confirm the main message of the present paper. Indeed, if people have social
preferences that do not satisfy B3, they can be in favor of an egalitarian distribution
even if they are, say, risk-neutral.
Conversely, one could question the “realism” of our assertion that economic
decisions are influenced by ethical convictions. In a sense, the main message of this
paper goes in the same direction as the one put on the forefront, e.g., by Foley
(2008): Economic theory at its most abstract level is a speculative philosophical
discourse, shaped by (at least implicit) ethical options as well as by deductive or
inductive scientific findings. The attempt to separate the economic sphere of life,
in which the pursuit of self-interest is led by some invisible hand of the market to
a socially beneficial outcome, from the rest of social life, in which the pursuit of
self-interest is morally problematic and has to be weighed against other ends, this
attempt is a short-cut that, according to the results given in this paper, need to be
reversed: the economic sphere of life is part of social life.
Demichelis & Weibull (2008) have proven that “honesty” enables evolutionary
stable Nash equilibria of (the lexicographic communication extension of) generic and
symmetric n × n-coordination games to concentrate on the unique Pareto optimal
outcome of the underling game. This shows, at least, that there exist situations
where ethics matters even at the efficiency level. In fact, ethical views de facto influ-
ence investor as well as consumer choices, not only at the time of presbyterian pietism
studied in Weber’s (1904) celebrated monograph, but also today. For example, Free-
man (2001) argues that Rawls’ original position could be used as a valuable thought
experiment for orienting management decisions. On the other hand, in 2006, the UN
launched an initiative called “Principles for Responsible Investments”:20 The asset
owners and investment managers who sign the six principles commit themselves to
integrate ESG (environmental, social and governance) criteria in their investment
decisions. By May 2008, 362 investors had signed these principles, representing
14.4 trillion dollars of investments. Fair Trade is also an alternative way of doing
business that seeks to build equitable, long-term partnerships between consumers in
Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and North America together with produc-
ers in developing regions. The global Fair Trade sales in 2007 are worth 2.65 billion
euros..21
Finally, current initiatives in favour of social business (Yunus (2008)) express the
will of entrepreneurs to endorse new economic models centered on the needs of the
poor, even if these actions are less profitable than conventional businesses.
Let us conclude with a final remark. Nussbaum (2006, p. 17) criticizes the social
contract theorists, and Rawls among them, in as much as they see the society as a
contract for mutual advantage between people who are free, equal and independent.
20See http://www.unpri.org.
21Cf. Krier (2007).
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This perspective does not take into account people who suffer from impairments or
disabilities. Even though we agree with Nussbaum’s criticism, we did not address
the issue in this paper: The parties behind the veil of ignorance do not possess any
serious physical or mental impairments that would prevent them from exhibiting
“preference” relations fulfilling C and A0 together with either A1 or A2. However,
the citizens for whom they design principles could suffer from such disabilities.
Gae¨l Giraud, CNRS, Paris School of Economics, ESCP-Europe, gael.giraud@parisschoolofeconomics.eu.
Ce´cile Renouard, ESSEC Business School, Paris, renouard@essec.fr.
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